Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] move the secure_computing call

[Andrew Lutomirski]

On Thu, May 24, 2012 at 5:38 PM, H. Peter Anvin <hpa@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 05/24/2012 05:26 PM, Andrew Lutomirski wrote:
>>
>> Just to clarify: are you suggesting that, for now, the traced behavior
>> should be:
>>
>> process -> seccomp -> ptrace -> kernel?
>>
>> If so, I think the man page or something should have a big fat warning
>> that seccomp filters should *never* allow ptrace (even PTRACE_TRACEME)
>> unless they fully understand the issue.
>>
>
> Yes, and yes.
>
>> In any case, I think that the UML interaction is missing the point.
>> UML will *emulate* the seccomp filter.  If it chooses to use host
>> seccomp filters for some business, that's its business.
>
> I don't see why UML should have to emulate the seccomp filter.  With the
> proposed order, then it can simply use the seccomp filter provided by
> the host.  Furthermore, with this sequencing UML can actually *use*
> seccomp to provide the simulation.

Hmm.  I guess I agree.  I'll shut up now :)

--Andy
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