Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] move the secure_computing call

[H. Peter Anvin]

On 05/24/2012 04:43 PM, Andrew Lutomirski wrote:
> 
> IMO the behavior should change.  Alternatively, a post-ptrace syscall
> should have to pass the *tracer's* seccomp filter, but that seems
> overcomplicated and confusing.
> 
> OTOH, allowing ptrace in a seccomp filter is asking for trouble anyway
> -- if you can ptrace something outside the sandbox, you've escaped.
> 

This is my suggestion: if there is demand, make it possible to install a
*second* seccomp filter program which is run on the result of the
ptrace.  I.e.:

Untraced:	process -> seccomp1 -> kernel

Traced:		process -> seccomp1 -> ptrace -> seccomp2 -> kernel

This is something we could add later if there is demand.

	-hpa


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