Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] move the secure_computing call

[James Morris]

On Thu, 24 May 2012, Will Drewry wrote:

> As is, the biggest benefit of this change is just setting consistent
> expectations in what the ptrace/seccomp interactions should be.  The
> current ability for ptrace to "bypass" secure computing (by remapping
> allowed system calls) is not necessarily a problem, but it is not
> necessarily intuitive behavior.

Indeed -- while the purpose of seccomp is to reduce the attack surface of 
the syscall interface, if a user allows ptrace, attackers will definitely 
see that as an attack vector, if it allows them to increase that attack 
surface.

It at least needs to be well-documented.

-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
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