Re: Grace period

From: Stanislav Kinsbursky
Date: Mon Apr 09 2012 - 12:57:12 EST


09.04.2012 20:33, Myklebust, Trond ÐÐÑÐÑ:
On Mon, 2012-04-09 at 12:21 -0400, bfields@xxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
On Mon, Apr 09, 2012 at 04:17:06PM +0000, Myklebust, Trond wrote:
On Mon, 2012-04-09 at 12:11 -0400, bfields@xxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
On Mon, Apr 09, 2012 at 08:08:57PM +0400, Stanislav Kinsbursky wrote:
09.04.2012 19:27, Jeff Layton ÐÐÑÐÑ:

If you allow one container to hand out conflicting locks while another
container is allowing reclaims, then you can end up with some very
difficult to debug silent data corruption. That's the worst possible
outcome, IMO. We really need to actively keep people from shooting
themselves in the foot here.

One possibility might be to only allow filesystems to be exported from
a single container at a time (and allow that to be overridable somehow
once we have a working active/active serving solution). With that, you
may be able limp along with a per-container grace period handling
scheme like you're proposing.


Ok then. Keeping people from shooting themselves here sounds reasonable.
And I like the idea of exporting a filesystem only from once per
network namespace.

Unfortunately that's not going to get us very far, especially not in the
v4 case where we've got the common read-only pseudoroot that everyone
has to share.

I don't see how that can work in cases where each container has its own
private mount namespace. You're going to have to tie that pseudoroot to
the mount namespace somehow.

Sure, but in typical cases it'll still be shared; requiring that they
not be sounds like a severe limitation.

I'd expect the typical case to be the non-shared namespace: the whole
point of containers is to provide for complete isolation of processes.
Usually that implies that you don't want them to be able to communicate
via a shared filesystem.


BTW, we DO use one mount namespace for all containers and host in OpenVZ. This allows us to have an access to containers mount points from initial environment. Isolation between containers is done via chroot and some simple tricks on /proc/mounts read operation.
Moreover, with one mount namespace, we currently support bind-mounting on NFS from one container into another...

Anyway, I'm sorry, but I'm not familiar with this pseudoroot idea.
Why does it prevents implementing of check for "superblock-network namespace" pair on NFS server start and forbid (?) it in case of this pair is shared already in other namespace? I.e. maybe this pseudoroot can be an exclusion from this rule?
Or I'm just missing the point at all?

--
Best regards,
Stanislav Kinsbursky
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