Re: [Keyrings] [PATCH 2/9] keys: update the description with infoabout "logon" keys

[Mimi Zohar]

On Wed, 2012-03-28 at 11:46 +0100, David Howells wrote:
> From: Jeff Layton <jlayton@xxxxxxxxxx>
> 
> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> 
>  Documentation/security/keys.txt |   15 ++++++++++++++-
>  1 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys.txt b/Documentation/security/keys.txt
> index 7877170..4c8cf36 100644
> --- a/Documentation/security/keys.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/security/keys.txt
> @@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ KEY SERVICE OVERVIEW
> 
>  The key service provides a number of features besides keys:
> 
> - (*) The key service defines two special key types:
> + (*) The key service defines three special key types:
> 
>       (+) "keyring"
> 
> @@ -137,6 +137,19 @@ The key service provides a number of features besides keys:
>  	 blobs of data. These can be created, updated and read by userspace,
>  	 and aren't intended for use by kernel services.
> 
> +     (+) "logon"
> +
> +         Like a "user" key, a "logon" key has a payload that is an arbitrary
> +         blob of data. It is intended as a place to store secrets that the
> +         to which the kernel should have access but that should not be
> +         accessable from userspace.

The last sentence is a bit awkward.  Can we rephrase it a bit?  Maybe
"which is accessible by the kernel, ..."?

thanks,

Mimi

> +
> +         The description can be arbitrary, but must be prefixed with a non-zero
> +         length string that describes the key "subclass". The subclass is
> +         separated from the rest of the description by a ':'. "logon" keys can
> +         be created and updated by userspace, but the payload is only readable
> +         from kernel space.
> +
>   (*) Each process subscribes to three keyrings: a thread-specific keyring, a
>       process-specific keyring, and a session-specific keyring.



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