[34-longterm 219/247] proc: protect mm start_code/end_code in /proc/pid/stat

From: Paul Gortmaker
Date: Thu Jun 23 2011 - 13:48:03 EST

From: Kees Cook <kees.cook@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

This is a commit scheduled for the next v2.6.34 longterm release.
If you see a problem with using this for longterm, please comment.

commit 5883f57ca0008ffc93e09cbb9847a1928e50c6f3 upstream.

While mm->start_stack was protected from cross-uid viewing (commit
f83ce3e6b02d5 ("proc: avoid information leaks to non-privileged
processes")), the start_code and end_code values were not. This would
allow the text location of a PIE binary to leak, defeating ASLR.

Note that the value "1" is used instead of "0" for a protected value since
"ps", "killall", and likely other readers of /proc/pid/stat, take
start_code of "0" to mean a kernel thread and will misbehave. Thanks to
Brad Spengler for pointing this out.

Addresses CVE-2011-0726

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
fs/proc/array.c | 4 ++--
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c
index ed2afa6..412e163 100644
--- a/fs/proc/array.c
+++ b/fs/proc/array.c
@@ -489,8 +489,8 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
mm ? get_mm_rss(mm) : 0,
- mm ? mm->start_code : 0,
- mm ? mm->end_code : 0,
+ mm ? (permitted ? mm->start_code : 1) : 0,
+ mm ? (permitted ? mm->end_code : 1) : 0,
(permitted && mm) ? mm->start_stack : 0,

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