[RFC v3 1/2] security: add task argument to security_capable()

From: Vasiliy Kulikov
Date: Mon Jun 20 2011 - 15:10:25 EST


This patch changes security_capable() to use explicit task
argument instead of current.

Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 5 ++++-
include/linux/security.h | 8 ++++----
kernel/capability.c | 2 +-
security/security.c | 6 +++---
4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
index 7bcf12a..bc52c66 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c
@@ -431,7 +431,10 @@ pci_read_config(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
u8 *data = (u8*) buf;

/* Several chips lock up trying to read undefined config space */
- if (security_capable(&init_user_ns, filp->f_cred, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0) {
+ if (security_capable(current,
+ &init_user_ns,
+ filp->f_cred,
+ CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0) {
size = dev->cfg_size;
} else if (dev->hdr_type == PCI_HEADER_TYPE_CARDBUS) {
size = 128;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 8ce59ef..8509dbf 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1667,8 +1667,8 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
const kernel_cap_t *effective,
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
-int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct cred *cred,
- int cap);
+int security_capable(struct task_struct *task, struct user_namespace *ns,
+ const struct cred *cred, int cap);
int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap);
int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk,
@@ -1865,10 +1865,10 @@ static inline int security_capset(struct cred *new,
return cap_capset(new, old, effective, inheritable, permitted);
}

-static inline int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns,
+static inline int security_capable(struct task_struct *task, struct user_namespace *ns,
const struct cred *cred, int cap)
{
- return cap_capable(current, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+ return cap_capable(task, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
}

static inline int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index 283c529..91c2278 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
BUG();
}

- if (security_capable(ns, current_cred(), cap) == 0) {
+ if (security_capable(current, ns, current_cred(), cap) == 0) {
current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
return true;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 4ba6d4c..dd16397 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -154,10 +154,10 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
effective, inheritable, permitted);
}

-int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct cred *cred,
- int cap)
+int security_capable(struct task_struct *task, struct user_namespace *ns,
+ const struct cred *cred, int cap)
{
- return security_ops->capable(current, cred, ns, cap,
+ return security_ops->capable(task, cred, ns, cap,
SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
}

---
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