[41/74] netfilter: ip_tables: fix infoleak to userspace

From: Greg KH
Date: Wed Apr 13 2011 - 12:01:13 EST


2.6.32-longterm review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@xxxxxxxxxxxx>

commit 78b79876761b86653df89c48a7010b5cbd41a84a upstream.

Structures ipt_replace, compat_ipt_replace, and xt_get_revision are
copied from userspace. Fields of these structs that are
zero-terminated strings are not checked. When they are used as argument
to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive
information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe
process.

The first and the third bugs were introduced before the git epoch; the
second was introduced in 2722971c (v2.6.17-rc1). To trigger the bug
one should have CAP_NET_ADMIN.

Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxx>

---
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
@@ -1290,6 +1290,7 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, void __user
/* overflow check */
if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
return -ENOMEM;
+ tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;

newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
if (!newinfo)
@@ -1820,6 +1821,7 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void
return -ENOMEM;
if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
return -ENOMEM;
+ tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;

newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
if (!newinfo)
@@ -2044,6 +2046,7 @@ do_ipt_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd,
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
+ rev.name[sizeof(rev.name)-1] = 0;

if (cmd == IPT_SO_GET_REVISION_TARGET)
target = 1;


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