Re: [PATCH] kernel: make /proc/kallsyms mode 400 to reduce ease of attacking

[Willy Tarreau]

On Mon, Nov 29, 2010 at 11:05:58AM -0800, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> Can we please not use CAP_SYS_ADMIN for this?  Relying on CAP_SYS_ADMIN
> is worse than anything else -- it is a fixed policy hardcoded in the
> kernel, with no ability for the system owner to delegate the policy
> outward, e.g. by adding group read permission and/or chgrp the file.
> 
> Delegating CAP_SYS_ADMIN, of course, otherwise known as "everything", is
> worse than anything...

Agreed, that's why I still think that hiding lots of valuable information to
non-root users will get more users added to unmanaged sudoers files, which
will result in much more holes in the systems than we currently have.

Willy

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