[01/17] aio: check for multiplication overflow in do_io_submit

From: Greg KH
Date: Fri Oct 22 2010 - 14:45:22 EST


2.6.27-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@xxxxxxxxxx>

commit 75e1c70fc31490ef8a373ea2a4bea2524099b478 upstream.

Tavis Ormandy pointed out that do_io_submit does not do proper bounds
checking on the passed-in iocb array:

       if (unlikely(nr < 0))
               return -EINVAL;

       if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, iocbpp, (nr*sizeof(iocbpp)))))
               return -EFAULT;                      ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

The attached patch checks for overflow, and if it is detected, the
number of iocbs submitted is scaled down to a number that will fit in
the long.  This is an ok thing to do, as sys_io_submit is documented as
returning the number of iocbs submitted, so callers should handle a
return value of less than the 'nr' argument passed in.

Reported-by: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxx>

---
fs/aio.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/aio.c
+++ b/fs/aio.c
@@ -1677,6 +1677,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(io_submit, aio_context_t
if (unlikely(nr < 0))
return -EINVAL;

+ if (unlikely(nr > LONG_MAX/sizeof(*iocbpp)))
+ nr = LONG_MAX/sizeof(*iocbpp);
+
if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, iocbpp, (nr*sizeof(*iocbpp)))))
return -EFAULT;



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