Re: [PATCH 0/3] Taming execve, setuid, and LSMs

[Andy Lutomirski]

On Apr 21, 2010, at 6:30 PM, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> Quoting Andrew Lutomirski (luto@xxxxxxx):
> > So if we give up on changing nosuid, there are a couple of things we
> > might want to do:
> >
> > 1. A mode where execve acts like all filesystems are MNT_NOSUID.   
> > This
> > sounds like a bad idea (if nothing else, it will cause apps that use
> > selinux's exec_sid mechanism (runcon?) to silently malfunction).
>
> I think at this point we've lost track of exactly what we're trying
> to do.
>
> The goal, at least for myself and (I think) Eric, was to prevent
> certain changes in environment, initiated by an unprivileged user,
> from confusing setuid-root programs (initiated by the user).
>
> A concrete example was the proposed disablenet feature, with which
> an unprivileged task can remove its ability to open any new network
> connections.
>
> With that in mind, I think option 1 is actually the best option.

I think the show-stopper for number 1 is the fact that nosuid has  
really strange semantics, and I'm a bit scared of making them more  
widespread. For example, selinux-aware apps can request a type change  
on exec, and nosuid causes that request to be silently ignored.  This  
could silently break otherwise-working selinux sandboxes.  Stephen  
doesn't want to change it...


> I especially hate option 2 because of the resulting temptation to
> fudge with pE  :)  If you're going to fudge with pE, then IMO it
> MUST be done in a new securebits mode.

I'll fight that fight later.  (I wish the original rule had been pE' =  
pE except when setuid root, but it's way too late for that...)

> Now actually, re-reading my msg, given our original goal, I dare
> say that Andrew Morgan's approach of simply returning -EPERM for
> any app which tries to setuid or change privileges on exec just
> might be the sanest way, at least to start with.

Fair enough.  It'll annoy some selinux users, but maybe the selinux  
people will figure out how to fix it when enough users complain.

I'll hack up and submit a patch series to add PR_EXEC_DISALLOW_PRIVS  
and allow CLONE_NEWNET when it's set.  Then I'll argue with Alan Cox  
for a week or three, I suppose :)

I think I'll arrange it so that PR_EXEC_DISALLOW_PRIVS & uid==0 &&  
(pP != all) && !SECURE_ROOT will cause execve to always fail.  nonoot  
&& pP != 0 && !KEEPCAPS will fail as well, since it seems silly to add  
a special case (if you're nonroot and create an unprivileged  
container, drop the caps yourself).

--Andy

(My system has a setuid binary that does unshare(CLONE_NEWIPC), drops  
privs and execs it's argument.  I'll be happy to get rid of it.)
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