Re: [PATCH] Enhance perf to collect KVM guest os statistics fromhost side

From: Ingo Molnar
Date: Tue Mar 16 2010 - 09:09:12 EST



* Avi Kivity <avi@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> On 03/16/2010 02:29 PM, Ingo Molnar wrote:

> > I mean, i can trust a kernel service and i can trust /proc/kallsyms.
> >
> > Can perf trust a random process claiming to be Qemu? What's the trust
> > mechanism here?
>
> Obviously you can't trust anything you get from a guest, no matter how you
> get it.

I'm not talking about the symbol strings and addresses, and the object
contents for allocation (or debuginfo). I'm talking about the basic protocol
of establishing which guest is which.

I.e. we really want to be able users to:

1) have it all working with a single guest, without having to specify 'which'
guest (qemu PID) to work with. That is the dominant usecase both for
developers and for a fair portion of testers.

2) Have some reasonable symbolic identification for guests. For example a
usable approach would be to have 'perf kvm list', which would list all
currently active guests:

$ perf kvm list
[1] Fedora
[2] OpenSuse
[3] Windows-XP
[4] Windows-7

And from that point on 'perf kvm -g OpenSuse record' would do the obvious
thing. Users will be able to just use the 'OpenSuse' symbolic name for
that guest, even if the guest got restarted and switched its main PID.

Any such facility needs trusted enumeration and a protocol where i can trust
that the information i got is authorative. (I.e. 'OpenSuse' truly matches to
the OpenSuse session - not to some local user starting up a Qemu instance that
claims to be 'OpenSuse'.)

Is such a scheme possible/available? I suspect all the KVM configuration tools
(i havent used them in some time - gui and command-line tools alike) use
similar methods to ease guest management?

Ingo
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