[PATCH 3/4] hwpoison: prevent /dev/kcore from accessing hwpoison pages

From: Wu Fengguang
Date: Sat Jan 30 2010 - 04:38:46 EST


Silently fill buffer with zeros when encounter hwpoison pages
(accessing the hwpoison page content is deadly).

This patch does not cover X86_32 - which has a dumb kern_addr_valid().
It is unlikely anyone run a 32bit kernel will care about the hwpoison
feature - its usable memory is limited.

CC: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxx>
CC: Andi Kleen <andi@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Pekka Enberg <penberg@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@xxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/mm/init_64.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- linux-mm.orig/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c 2010-01-13 21:23:04.000000000 +0800
+++ linux-mm/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c 2010-01-13 21:25:32.000000000 +0800
@@ -825,6 +825,7 @@ int __init reserve_bootmem_generic(unsig
int kern_addr_valid(unsigned long addr)
{
unsigned long above = ((long)addr) >> __VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT;
+ unsigned long pfn;
pgd_t *pgd;
pud_t *pud;
pmd_t *pmd;
@@ -845,14 +846,23 @@ int kern_addr_valid(unsigned long addr)
if (pmd_none(*pmd))
return 0;

- if (pmd_large(*pmd))
- return pfn_valid(pmd_pfn(*pmd));
+ if (pmd_large(*pmd)) {
+ pfn = pmd_pfn(*pmd);
+ pfn += pte_index(addr);
+ goto check_pfn;
+ }

pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, addr);
if (pte_none(*pte))
return 0;

- return pfn_valid(pte_pfn(*pte));
+ pfn = pte_pfn(*pte);
+check_pfn:
+ if (!pfn_valid(pfn))
+ return 0;
+ if (PageHWPoison(pfn_to_page(pfn)))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
}

/*


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