[PATCH] Revert "CRED: Add some configurable debugging [try #6]"

From: Ingo Molnar
Date: Sat Sep 12 2009 - 04:16:42 EST

This reverts commit e0e817392b9acf2c98d3be80c233dddb1b52003d.
---
fs/nfsd/auth.c | 4 -
fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c | 2 -
fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 3 -
fs/open.c | 2 -
include/linux/cred.h | 65 +------------
kernel/cred.c | 250 +--------------------------------------------
kernel/exit.c | 4 -
kernel/fork.c | 6 +-
kernel/kmod.c | 1 -
lib/Kconfig.debug | 15 ---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 +-
11 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 346 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/nfsd/auth.c b/fs/nfsd/auth.c
index 36fcabb..5573508 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/auth.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/auth.c
@@ -34,8 +34,6 @@ int nfsd_setuser(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp)
int flags = nfsexp_flags(rqstp, exp);
int ret;

- validate_process_creds();
-
/* discard any old override before preparing the new set */
revert_creds(get_cred(current->real_cred));
new = prepare_creds();
@@ -88,10 +86,8 @@ int nfsd_setuser(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp)
else
new->cap_effective = cap_raise_nfsd_set(new->cap_effective,
new->cap_permitted);
- validate_process_creds();
put_cred(override_creds(new));
put_cred(new);
- validate_process_creds();
return 0;

oom:
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c b/fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c
index 24d58ad..492c79b 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c
@@ -496,9 +496,7 @@ nfsd(void *vrqstp)
/* Lock the export hash tables for reading. */
exp_readlock();

- validate_process_creds();
svc_process(rqstp);
- validate_process_creds();

/* Unlock export hash tables */
exp_readunlock();
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
index 8fa09bf..23341c1 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
@@ -684,8 +684,6 @@ nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, int type,
__be32 err;
int host_err;

- validate_process_creds();
-
/*
* If we get here, then the client has already done an "open",
* and (hopefully) checked permission - so allow OWNER_OVERRIDE
@@ -742,7 +740,6 @@ nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, int type,
out_nfserr:
err = nfserrno(host_err);
out:
- validate_process_creds();
return err;
}

diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index 31191bf..40d1fa2 100644
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -959,8 +959,6 @@ struct file *dentry_open(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags,
int error;
struct file *f;

- validate_creds(cred);
-
/*
* We must always pass in a valid mount pointer. Historically
* callers got away with not passing it, but we must enforce this at
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index 85439ab..b3c76e8 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -114,13 +114,6 @@ struct thread_group_cred {
*/
struct cred {
atomic_t usage;
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
- atomic_t subscribers; /* number of processes subscribed */
- void *put_addr;
- unsigned magic;
-#define CRED_MAGIC 0x43736564
-#define CRED_MAGIC_DEAD 0x44656144
-#endif
uid_t uid; /* real UID of the task */
gid_t gid; /* real GID of the task */
uid_t suid; /* saved UID of the task */
@@ -150,7 +143,6 @@ struct cred {
};

extern void __put_cred(struct cred *);
-extern void exit_creds(struct task_struct *);
extern int copy_creds(struct task_struct *, unsigned long);
extern struct cred *prepare_creds(void);
extern struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void);
@@ -166,60 +158,6 @@ extern int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *, const char *);
extern int set_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
extern void __init cred_init(void);

-/*
- * check for validity of credentials
- */
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
-extern void __invalid_creds(const struct cred *, const char *, unsigned);
-extern void __validate_process_creds(struct task_struct *,
- const char *, unsigned);
-
-static inline bool creds_are_invalid(const struct cred *cred)
-{
- if (cred->magic != CRED_MAGIC)
- return true;
- if (atomic_read(&cred->usage) < atomic_read(&cred->subscribers))
- return true;
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
- if ((unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE)
- return true;
- if ((*(u32*)cred->security & 0xffffff00) ==
- (POISON_FREE << 24 | POISON_FREE << 16 | POISON_FREE << 8))
- return true;
-#endif
- return false;
-}
-
-static inline void __validate_creds(const struct cred *cred,
- const char *file, unsigned line)
-{
- if (unlikely(creds_are_invalid(cred)))
- __invalid_creds(cred, file, line);
-}
-
-#define validate_creds(cred) \
-do { \
- __validate_creds((cred), __FILE__, __LINE__); \
-} while(0)
-
-#define validate_process_creds() \
-do { \
- __validate_process_creds(current, __FILE__, __LINE__); \
-} while(0)
-
-extern void validate_creds_for_do_exit(struct task_struct *);
-#else
-static inline void validate_creds(const struct cred *cred)
-{
-}
-static inline void validate_creds_for_do_exit(struct task_struct *tsk)
-{
-}
-static inline void validate_process_creds(void)
-{
-}
-#endif
-
/**
* get_new_cred - Get a reference on a new set of credentials
* @cred: The new credentials to reference
@@ -249,7 +187,6 @@ static inline struct cred *get_new_cred(struct cred *cred)
static inline const struct cred *get_cred(const struct cred *cred)
{
struct cred *nonconst_cred = (struct cred *) cred;
- validate_creds(cred);
return get_new_cred(nonconst_cred);
}

@@ -268,7 +205,7 @@ static inline void put_cred(const struct cred *_cred)
{
struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) _cred;

- validate_creds(cred);
+ BUG_ON(atomic_read(&(cred)->usage) <= 0);
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&(cred)->usage))
__put_cred(cred);
}
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 24dd2f5..1bb4d7e 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -18,18 +18,6 @@
#include <linux/cn_proc.h>
#include "cred-internals.h"

-#if 0
-#define kdebug(FMT, ...) \
- printk("[%-5.5s%5u] "FMT"\n", current->comm, current->pid ,##__VA_ARGS__)
-#else
-static inline __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)))
-void no_printk(const char *fmt, ...)
-{
-}
-#define kdebug(FMT, ...) \
- no_printk("[%-5.5s%5u] "FMT"\n", current->comm, current->pid ,##__VA_ARGS__)
-#endif
-
static struct kmem_cache *cred_jar;

/*
@@ -48,10 +36,6 @@ static struct thread_group_cred init_tgcred = {
*/
struct cred init_cred = {
.usage = ATOMIC_INIT(4),
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
- .subscribers = ATOMIC_INIT(2),
- .magic = CRED_MAGIC,
-#endif
.securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT,
.cap_inheritable = CAP_INIT_INH_SET,
.cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET,
@@ -64,31 +48,6 @@ struct cred init_cred = {
#endif
};

-static inline void set_cred_subscribers(struct cred *cred, int n)
-{
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
- atomic_set(&cred->subscribers, n);
-#endif
-}
-
-static inline int read_cred_subscribers(const struct cred *cred)
-{
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
- return atomic_read(&cred->subscribers);
-#else
- return 0;
-#endif
-}
-
-static inline void alter_cred_subscribers(const struct cred *_cred, int n)
-{
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
- struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) _cred;
-
- atomic_add(n, &cred->subscribers);
-#endif
-}
-
/*
* Dispose of the shared task group credentials
*/
@@ -126,22 +85,9 @@ static void put_cred_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
{
struct cred *cred = container_of(rcu, struct cred, rcu);

- kdebug("put_cred_rcu(%p)", cred);
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
- if (cred->magic != CRED_MAGIC_DEAD ||
- atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0 ||
- read_cred_subscribers(cred) != 0)
- panic("CRED: put_cred_rcu() sees %p with"
- " mag %x, put %p, usage %d, subscr %d\n",
- cred, cred->magic, cred->put_addr,
- atomic_read(&cred->usage),
- read_cred_subscribers(cred));
-#else
if (atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0)
panic("CRED: put_cred_rcu() sees %p with usage %d\n",
cred, atomic_read(&cred->usage));
-#endif

security_cred_free(cred);
key_put(cred->thread_keyring);
@@ -160,47 +106,12 @@ static void put_cred_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
*/
void __put_cred(struct cred *cred)
{
- kdebug("__put_cred(%p{%d,%d})", cred,
- atomic_read(&cred->usage),
- read_cred_subscribers(cred));
-
BUG_ON(atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0);
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
- BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(cred) != 0);
- cred->magic = CRED_MAGIC_DEAD;
- cred->put_addr = __builtin_return_address(0);
-#endif
- BUG_ON(cred == current->cred);
- BUG_ON(cred == current->real_cred);

call_rcu(&cred->rcu, put_cred_rcu);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_cred);

-/*
- * Clean up a task's credentials when it exits
- */
-void exit_creds(struct task_struct *tsk)
-{
- struct cred *cred;
-
- kdebug("exit_creds(%u,%p,%p,{%d,%d})", tsk->pid, tsk->real_cred, tsk->cred,
- atomic_read(&tsk->cred->usage),
- read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred));
-
- cred = (struct cred *) tsk->real_cred;
- tsk->real_cred = NULL;
- validate_creds(cred);
- alter_cred_subscribers(cred, -1);
- put_cred(cred);
-
- cred = (struct cred *) tsk->cred;
- tsk->cred = NULL;
- validate_creds(cred);
- alter_cred_subscribers(cred, -1);
- put_cred(cred);
-}
-
/**
* prepare_creds - Prepare a new set of credentials for modification
*
@@ -221,19 +132,16 @@ struct cred *prepare_creds(void)
const struct cred *old;
struct cred *new;

- validate_process_creds();
+ BUG_ON(atomic_read(&task->real_cred->usage) < 1);

new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new)
return NULL;

- kdebug("prepare_creds() alloc %p", new);
-
old = task->cred;
memcpy(new, old, sizeof(struct cred));

atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
- set_cred_subscribers(new, 0);
get_group_info(new->group_info);
get_uid(new->user);

@@ -249,7 +157,6 @@ struct cred *prepare_creds(void)

if (security_prepare_creds(new, old, GFP_KERNEL) < 0)
goto error;
- validate_creds(new);
return new;

error:
@@ -322,12 +229,9 @@ struct cred *prepare_usermodehelper_creds(void)
if (!new)
return NULL;

- kdebug("prepare_usermodehelper_creds() alloc %p", new);
-
memcpy(new, &init_cred, sizeof(struct cred));

atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
- set_cred_subscribers(new, 0);
get_group_info(new->group_info);
get_uid(new->user);

@@ -346,7 +250,6 @@ struct cred *prepare_usermodehelper_creds(void)
#endif
if (security_prepare_creds(new, &init_cred, GFP_ATOMIC) < 0)
goto error;
- validate_creds(new);

BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) != 1);
return new;
@@ -383,10 +286,6 @@ int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
) {
p->real_cred = get_cred(p->cred);
get_cred(p->cred);
- alter_cred_subscribers(p->cred, 2);
- kdebug("share_creds(%p{%d,%d})",
- p->cred, atomic_read(&p->cred->usage),
- read_cred_subscribers(p->cred));
atomic_inc(&p->cred->user->processes);
return 0;
}
@@ -432,8 +331,6 @@ int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)

atomic_inc(&new->user->processes);
p->cred = p->real_cred = get_cred(new);
- alter_cred_subscribers(new, 2);
- validate_creds(new);
return 0;

error_put:
@@ -458,20 +355,13 @@ error_put:
int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
{
struct task_struct *task = current;
- const struct cred *old = task->real_cred;
-
- kdebug("commit_creds(%p{%d,%d})", new,
- atomic_read(&new->usage),
- read_cred_subscribers(new));
+ const struct cred *old;

- BUG_ON(task->cred != old);
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
- BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(old) < 2);
- validate_creds(old);
- validate_creds(new);
-#endif
+ BUG_ON(task->cred != task->real_cred);
+ BUG_ON(atomic_read(&task->real_cred->usage) < 2);
BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1);

+ old = task->real_cred;
security_commit_creds(new, old);

get_cred(new); /* we will require a ref for the subj creds too */
@@ -500,14 +390,12 @@ int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
* cheaply with the new uid cache, so if it matters
* we should be checking for it. -DaveM
*/
- alter_cred_subscribers(new, 2);
if (new->user != old->user)
atomic_inc(&new->user->processes);
rcu_assign_pointer(task->real_cred, new);
rcu_assign_pointer(task->cred, new);
if (new->user != old->user)
atomic_dec(&old->user->processes);
- alter_cred_subscribers(old, -2);

sched_switch_user(task);

@@ -540,13 +428,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(commit_creds);
*/
void abort_creds(struct cred *new)
{
- kdebug("abort_creds(%p{%d,%d})", new,
- atomic_read(&new->usage),
- read_cred_subscribers(new));
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
- BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(new) != 0);
-#endif
BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1);
put_cred(new);
}
@@ -563,20 +444,7 @@ const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *new)
{
const struct cred *old = current->cred;

- kdebug("override_creds(%p{%d,%d})", new,
- atomic_read(&new->usage),
- read_cred_subscribers(new));
-
- validate_creds(old);
- validate_creds(new);
- get_cred(new);
- alter_cred_subscribers(new, 1);
- rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, new);
- alter_cred_subscribers(old, -1);
-
- kdebug("override_creds() = %p{%d,%d}", old,
- atomic_read(&old->usage),
- read_cred_subscribers(old));
+ rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, get_cred(new));
return old;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(override_creds);
@@ -592,15 +460,7 @@ void revert_creds(const struct cred *old)
{
const struct cred *override = current->cred;

- kdebug("revert_creds(%p{%d,%d})", old,
- atomic_read(&old->usage),
- read_cred_subscribers(old));
-
- validate_creds(old);
- validate_creds(override);
- alter_cred_subscribers(old, 1);
rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, old);
- alter_cred_subscribers(override, -1);
put_cred(override);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(revert_creds);
@@ -642,15 +502,11 @@ struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *daemon)
if (!new)
return NULL;

- kdebug("prepare_kernel_cred() alloc %p", new);
-
if (daemon)
old = get_task_cred(daemon);
else
old = get_cred(&init_cred);

- validate_creds(old);
-
*new = *old;
get_uid(new->user);
get_group_info(new->group_info);
@@ -670,9 +526,7 @@ struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *daemon)
goto error;

atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
- set_cred_subscribers(new, 0);
put_cred(old);
- validate_creds(new);
return new;

error:
@@ -735,95 +589,3 @@ int set_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
return security_kernel_create_files_as(new, inode);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_create_files_as);
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
-
-/*
- * dump invalid credentials
- */
-static void dump_invalid_creds(const struct cred *cred, const char *label,
- const struct task_struct *tsk)
-{
- printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: %s credentials: %p %s%s%s\n",
- label, cred,
- cred == &init_cred ? "[init]" : "",
- cred == tsk->real_cred ? "[real]" : "",
- cred == tsk->cred ? "[eff]" : "");
- printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->magic=%x, put_addr=%p\n",
- cred->magic, cred->put_addr);
- printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->usage=%d, subscr=%d\n",
- atomic_read(&cred->usage),
- read_cred_subscribers(cred));
- printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->*uid = { %d,%d,%d,%d }\n",
- cred->uid, cred->euid, cred->suid, cred->fsuid);
- printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->*gid = { %d,%d,%d,%d }\n",
- cred->gid, cred->egid, cred->sgid, cred->fsgid);
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
- printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->security is %p\n", cred->security);
- if ((unsigned long) cred->security >= PAGE_SIZE &&
- (((unsigned long) cred->security & 0xffffff00) !=
- (POISON_FREE << 24 | POISON_FREE << 16 | POISON_FREE << 8)))
- printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->security {%x, %x}\n",
- ((u32*)cred->security)[0],
- ((u32*)cred->security)[1]);
-#endif
-}
-
-/*
- * report use of invalid credentials
- */
-void __invalid_creds(const struct cred *cred, const char *file, unsigned line)
-{
- printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: Invalid credentials\n");
- printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: At %s:%u\n", file, line);
- dump_invalid_creds(cred, "Specified", current);
- BUG();
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(__invalid_creds);
-
-/*
- * check the credentials on a process
- */
-void __validate_process_creds(struct task_struct *tsk,
- const char *file, unsigned line)
-{
- if (tsk->cred == tsk->real_cred) {
- if (unlikely(read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred) < 2 ||
- creds_are_invalid(tsk->cred)))
- goto invalid_creds;
- } else {
- if (unlikely(read_cred_subscribers(tsk->real_cred) < 1 ||
- read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred) < 1 ||
- creds_are_invalid(tsk->real_cred) ||
- creds_are_invalid(tsk->cred)))
- goto invalid_creds;
- }
- return;
-
-invalid_creds:
- printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: Invalid process credentials\n");
- printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: At %s:%u\n", file, line);
-
- dump_invalid_creds(tsk->real_cred, "Real", tsk);
- if (tsk->cred != tsk->real_cred)
- dump_invalid_creds(tsk->cred, "Effective", tsk);
- else
- printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: Effective creds == Real creds\n");
- BUG();
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(__validate_process_creds);
-
-/*
- * check creds for do_exit()
- */
-void validate_creds_for_do_exit(struct task_struct *tsk)
-{
- kdebug("validate_creds_for_do_exit(%p,%p{%d,%d})",
- tsk->real_cred, tsk->cred,
- atomic_read(&tsk->cred->usage),
- read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred));
-
- __validate_process_creds(tsk, __FILE__, __LINE__);
-}
-
-#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS */
diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
index ae5d866..263f95e 100644
--- a/kernel/exit.c
+++ b/kernel/exit.c
@@ -901,8 +901,6 @@ NORET_TYPE void do_exit(long code)

tracehook_report_exit(&code);

- validate_creds_for_do_exit(tsk);
-
/*
* We're taking recursive faults here in do_exit. Safest is to just
* leave this task alone and wait for reboot.
@@ -1011,8 +1009,6 @@ NORET_TYPE void do_exit(long code)
if (tsk->splice_pipe)
__free_pipe_info(tsk->splice_pipe);

- validate_creds_for_do_exit(tsk);
-
preempt_disable();
exit_rcu();
/* causes final put_task_struct in finish_task_switch(). */
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index bfee931..637520c 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -152,7 +152,8 @@ void __put_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk)
WARN_ON(atomic_read(&tsk->usage));
WARN_ON(tsk == current);

- exit_creds(tsk);
+ put_cred(tsk->real_cred);
+ put_cred(tsk->cred);
delayacct_tsk_free(tsk);

if (!profile_handoff_task(tsk))
@@ -1293,7 +1294,8 @@ bad_fork_cleanup_put_domain:
module_put(task_thread_info(p)->exec_domain->module);
bad_fork_cleanup_count:
atomic_dec(&p->cred->user->processes);
- exit_creds(p);
+ put_cred(p->real_cred);
+ put_cred(p->cred);
bad_fork_free:
free_task(p);
fork_out:
diff --git a/kernel/kmod.c b/kernel/kmod.c
index 9fcb53a..94abc21 100644
--- a/kernel/kmod.c
+++ b/kernel/kmod.c
@@ -470,7 +470,6 @@ int call_usermodehelper_exec(struct subprocess_info *sub_info,
int retval = 0;

BUG_ON(atomic_read(&sub_info->cred->usage) != 1);
- validate_creds(sub_info->cred);

helper_lock();
if (sub_info->path[0] == '\0')
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug
index e08ffa1..63f0906 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.debug
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug
@@ -652,21 +652,6 @@ config DEBUG_NOTIFIERS
This is a relatively cheap check but if you care about maximum
performance, say N.

-config DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
- bool "Debug credential management"
- depends on DEBUG_KERNEL
- help
- Enable this to turn on some debug checking for credential
- management. The additional code keeps track of the number of
- pointers from task_structs to any given cred struct, and checks to
- see that this number never exceeds the usage count of the cred
- struct.
-
- Furthermore, if SELinux is enabled, this also checks that the
- security pointer in the cred struct is never seen to be invalid.
-
- If unsure, say N.
-
#
# Select this config option from the architecture Kconfig, if it
# it is preferred to always offer frame pointers as a config
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index ec04cc2..772c1fa 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1535,8 +1535,6 @@ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 sid;

- validate_creds(cred);
-
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return 0;

@@ -3243,9 +3241,7 @@ static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
-
- BUG_ON((unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
- cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
+ cred->security = NULL;
kfree(tsec);
}

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