Re: Security fix for remapping of page 0 (was [PATCH] ChangeZERO_SIZE_PTR to point at unmapped space)

From: Linus Torvalds
Date: Wed Jun 03 2009 - 13:37:02 EST




On Wed, 3 Jun 2009, Alan Cox wrote:
>
> One way you could approach this would be to write a security module for
> non SELINUX users - one that did one thing alone - decide whether the app
> being run was permitted to map the low 64K perhaps by checking the
> security label on the file.

Unnecessary. I really think that 99% of all people are perfectly fine with
just the "mmap_min_addr" rule, and no more.

The rest could just use SElinux or set it to zero. It's not like allowing
mmap's at NULL is a huge problem. Sure, it allows a certain kind of attack
vector, but it's by no means an easy or common one - you need to already
have gotten fairly good local access to take advantage of it.

Linus
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