Re: Q: check_unsafe_exec() races (Was: [PATCH 2/4] fix setuidsometimes doesn't)

From: Oleg Nesterov
Date: Mon Apr 06 2009 - 11:41:48 EST


On 04/01, Al Viro wrote:
>
> Rebased and pushed (same tree, same branch; included into for-next, along
> with related cleanups).

Sorry for delay!

Afaics, the usage of fs->in_exec is not completely right. But firstly, a
couple of minor nits.


check_unsafe_exec() doesn't need ->siglock, we can iterate over sub-threads
under rcu_read_lock(). Note that with RCU or ->siglock we can set the "wrong"
LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE if we race with copy_process(CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_FS), but
as it was already discussed we don't care. This means it is OK to miss the
freshly cloned thread which has already passed copy_fs().


do_execve:

/* execve succeeded */
write_lock(&current->fs->lock);
current->fs->in_exec = 0;
write_unlock(&current->fs->lock);

afaics, fs->lock is not needed. If ->in_exec was set, it was set by this
thread-group and we do not share ->fs with another process. Since we are
the only thread now, we can clear ->in_exec lockless.


And now, what I think is wrong:

do_execve:

out_unmark:
write_lock(&current->fs->lock);
current->fs->in_exec = 0;
write_unlock(&current->fs->lock);

Two threads T1 and T2 and another process P, all share the same ->fs.

T1 starts do_execve(BAD_FILE). It calls check_unsafe_exec(), since ->fs is
shared, we set LSM_UNSAFE but not ->in_exec (actually, not very good name).

P exits and decrements fs->users.

T2 starts do_execve(), calls check_unsafe_exec(), now ->fs is not shared,
we set fs->in_exec.

T1 continues, open_exec(BAD_FILE) fails, we clear ->in_exec and return
to the user-space.

T1 does clone(CLONE_FS /* without CLONE_THREAD */).

T1 continues without LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE while ->fs is shared with another
process.


What do you think about the (uncompiled) patch below ? It doesn't change
compat_do_execve(), just for discussion.

But see also another message I am going to send...

Oleg.

do_execve() must not clear fs->in_exec if it was set by another thread,
and we don't need fs->lock to clear.

Also, s/lock_task_sighand/rcu_read_lock/ in check_unsafe_exec().

--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1060,7 +1060,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(install_exec_creds);
int check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
struct task_struct *p = current, *t;
- unsigned long flags;
unsigned n_fs;
int res = 0;

@@ -1068,11 +1067,12 @@ int check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binpr

n_fs = 1;
write_lock(&p->fs->lock);
- lock_task_sighand(p, &flags);
+ rcu_read_lock();
for (t = next_thread(p); t != p; t = next_thread(t)) {
if (t->fs == p->fs)
n_fs++;
}
+ rcu_read_unlock();

if (p->fs->users > n_fs) {
bprm->unsafe |= LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE;
@@ -1080,9 +1080,8 @@ int check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binpr
if (p->fs->in_exec)
res = -EAGAIN;
p->fs->in_exec = 1;
+ res = 1;
}
-
- unlock_task_sighand(p, &flags);
write_unlock(&p->fs->lock);

return res;
@@ -1284,6 +1283,7 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
struct linux_binprm *bprm;
struct file *file;
struct files_struct *displaced;
+ bool clear_in_exec;
int retval;

retval = unshare_files(&displaced);
@@ -1306,8 +1306,9 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
goto out_unlock;

retval = check_unsafe_exec(bprm);
- if (retval)
+ if (retval < 0)
goto out_unlock;
+ clear_in_exec = retval;

file = open_exec(filename);
retval = PTR_ERR(file);
@@ -1355,9 +1356,7 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
goto out;

/* execve succeeded */
- write_lock(&current->fs->lock);
current->fs->in_exec = 0;
- write_unlock(&current->fs->lock);
current->in_execve = 0;
mutex_unlock(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
acct_update_integrals(current);
@@ -1377,9 +1376,8 @@ out_file:
}

out_unmark:
- write_lock(&current->fs->lock);
- current->fs->in_exec = 0;
- write_unlock(&current->fs->lock);
+ if (clear_in_exec)
+ current->fs->in_exec = 0;

out_unlock:
current->in_execve = 0;

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