Re: [PATCH 1/4] integrity: TPM internel kernel interface

[Alan Cox]

> "goodies", the TCG technology does not protect against hardware
> attacks such as replacing the TPM with a bogus device, replacing the
> CRTM hardware, flashing the CRTM using a JTAG cable, lifting a TPM pin>
> and asserting reset, using a JTAG cable to set breakpoints and alter
> memory, etc.
> 
> For this use case, the attack model is a remote, software attack.  The>
> user is not considered the attacker.

Surely if I can replace your TPM with alternative hardware then I can
also replace it with virtualised software traps.

[If there is a good document on this btw please just point me there
instead and I'll go read further]
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