[patch 24/47] can: add sanity checks

From: Greg KH
Date: Tue Jul 22 2008 - 19:26:25 EST


2.6.25-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us
know.

------------------
From: Oliver Hartkopp <oliver@xxxxxxxxxxxx>

commit 7f2d38eb7a42bea1c1df51bbdaa2ca0f0bdda07f upstream

Even though the CAN netlayer only deals with CAN netdevices, the
netlayer interface to the userspace and to the device layer should
perform some sanity checks.

This patch adds several sanity checks that mainly prevent userspace apps
to send broken content into the system that may be misinterpreted by
some other userspace application.

Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <oliver.hartkopp@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Urs Thuermann <urs.thuermann@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Andre Naujoks <nautsch@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxx>

---
net/can/af_can.c | 10 ++++++++++
net/can/bcm.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++----
net/can/raw.c | 3 +++
3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/net/can/af_can.c
+++ b/net/can/af_can.c
@@ -205,12 +205,19 @@ static int can_create(struct net *net, s
* -ENOBUFS on full driver queue (see net_xmit_errno())
* -ENOMEM when local loopback failed at calling skb_clone()
* -EPERM when trying to send on a non-CAN interface
+ * -EINVAL when the skb->data does not contain a valid CAN frame
*/
int can_send(struct sk_buff *skb, int loop)
{
struct sk_buff *newskb = NULL;
+ struct can_frame *cf = (struct can_frame *)skb->data;
int err;

+ if (skb->len != sizeof(struct can_frame) || cf->can_dlc > 8) {
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
if (skb->dev->type != ARPHRD_CAN) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return -EPERM;
@@ -605,6 +612,7 @@ static int can_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct packet_type *pt, struct net_device *orig_dev)
{
struct dev_rcv_lists *d;
+ struct can_frame *cf = (struct can_frame *)skb->data;
int matches;

if (dev->type != ARPHRD_CAN || dev->nd_net != &init_net) {
@@ -612,6 +620,8 @@ static int can_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb,
return 0;
}

+ BUG_ON(skb->len != sizeof(struct can_frame) || cf->can_dlc > 8);
+
/* update statistics */
can_stats.rx_frames++;
can_stats.rx_frames_delta++;
--- a/net/can/bcm.c
+++ b/net/can/bcm.c
@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ static void bcm_send_to_user(struct bcm_

if (head->nframes) {
/* can_frames starting here */
- firstframe = (struct can_frame *) skb_tail_pointer(skb);
+ firstframe = (struct can_frame *)skb_tail_pointer(skb);

memcpy(skb_put(skb, datalen), frames, datalen);

@@ -818,6 +818,10 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_h
for (i = 0; i < msg_head->nframes; i++) {
err = memcpy_fromiovec((u8 *)&op->frames[i],
msg->msg_iov, CFSIZ);
+
+ if (op->frames[i].can_dlc > 8)
+ err = -EINVAL;
+
if (err < 0)
return err;

@@ -850,6 +854,10 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_h
for (i = 0; i < msg_head->nframes; i++) {
err = memcpy_fromiovec((u8 *)&op->frames[i],
msg->msg_iov, CFSIZ);
+
+ if (op->frames[i].can_dlc > 8)
+ err = -EINVAL;
+
if (err < 0) {
if (op->frames != &op->sframe)
kfree(op->frames);
@@ -1161,9 +1169,12 @@ static int bcm_tx_send(struct msghdr *ms

skb->dev = dev;
skb->sk = sk;
- can_send(skb, 1); /* send with loopback */
+ err = can_send(skb, 1); /* send with loopback */
dev_put(dev);

+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
return CFSIZ + MHSIZ;
}

@@ -1182,6 +1193,10 @@ static int bcm_sendmsg(struct kiocb *ioc
if (!bo->bound)
return -ENOTCONN;

+ /* check for valid message length from userspace */
+ if (size < MHSIZ || (size - MHSIZ) % CFSIZ)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
/* check for alternative ifindex for this bcm_op */

if (!ifindex && msg->msg_name) {
@@ -1256,8 +1271,8 @@ static int bcm_sendmsg(struct kiocb *ioc
break;

case TX_SEND:
- /* we need at least one can_frame */
- if (msg_head.nframes < 1)
+ /* we need exactly one can_frame behind the msg head */
+ if ((msg_head.nframes != 1) || (size != CFSIZ + MHSIZ))
ret = -EINVAL;
else
ret = bcm_tx_send(msg, ifindex, sk);
--- a/net/can/raw.c
+++ b/net/can/raw.c
@@ -632,6 +632,9 @@ static int raw_sendmsg(struct kiocb *ioc
} else
ifindex = ro->ifindex;

+ if (size != sizeof(struct can_frame))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
dev = dev_get_by_index(&init_net, ifindex);
if (!dev)
return -ENXIO;

--
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