Re: Possible problem in linux file posix capabilities

[Casey Schaufler]

--- "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> ....
> 
> Two quick fixes for you right now (apart from the one you've already
> got :)  would be
> 
> 	1. give wireshark cap_kill, by doing something like
> 
> 		capset cap_kill=ep /bin/wireshark
> 
> 	2. compile a kernel with SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=n
> 
> Andrew, this pretty much was bound to happen...  we need to figure out
> what our approach here should be.  My preference is still to allow
> signals when p->uid==current->uid so long as !SECURE_NOROOT.  Then as
> people start using secure_noroot process trees they at least must know
> what they're asking for.
> 
> An alternative stance is to accept these things as they come up and try
> to quickly work with the authors of such programs to work around it.  I
> suppose in a security sense that's the superior way :)  But it also
> seems likely to lead to most people choosing option 2 above and not
> bothering to fix the problem.

I probably just missed it when it went by, but do you have some
test cases for file capabilities lying about that I might use?

Thank you.


Casey Schaufler
casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
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