Re: [PATCH] capabilities: introduce per-process capabilitybounding set (v10)

[serge]

Quoting KaiGai Kohei (kaigai@xxxxxxxxxxxx):
> Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > The capability bounding set is a set beyond which capabilities
> > cannot grow.  Currently cap_bset is per-system.  It can be
> > manipulated through sysctl, but only init can add capabilities.
> > Root can remove capabilities.  By default it includes all caps
> > except CAP_SETPCAP.
> 
> Serge,
> 
> This feature makes me being interested in.
> I think you intend to apply this feature for the primary process
> of security container.
> However, it is also worthwhile to apply when a session is starting up.
> 
> The following PAM module enables to drop capability bounding bit
> specified by the fifth field in /etc/passwd entry.
> This code is just an example now, but considerable feature.
> 
> build and install:
> # gcc -Wall -c pam_cap_drop.c
> # gcc -Wall -shared -Xlinker -x -o pam_cap_drop.so pam_cap_drop.o -lpam
> # cp pam_cap_drop.so /lib/security
> 
> modify /etc/passwd as follows:
> 
> tak:x:1004:100:cap_drop=cap_net_raw,cap_chown:/home/tak:/bin/bash
>                ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> example:
> [kaigai@masu ~]$ ping 192.168.1.1
> PING 192.168.1.1 (192.168.1.1) 56(84) bytes of data.
> 64 bytes from 192.168.1.1: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=1.23 ms
> 64 bytes from 192.168.1.1: icmp_seq=2 ttl=64 time=1.02 ms
> 
> --- 192.168.1.1 ping statistics ---
> 2 packets transmitted, 2 received, 0% packet loss, time 999ms
> rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 1.023/1.130/1.237/0.107 ms
> 
> [kaigai@masu ~]$ ssh tak@localhost
> tak@localhost's password:
> Last login: Sat Dec  1 10:09:29 2007 from masu.myhome.cx
> [tak@masu ~]$ export LANG=C
> [tak@masu ~]$ ping 192.168.1.1
> ping: icmp open socket: Operation not permitted
> 
> [tak@masu ~]$ su
> Password:
> pam_cap_bset[6921]: user root does not have 'cap_drop=' property
> [root@masu tak]# cat /proc/self/status | grep ^Cap
> CapInh: 0000000000000000
> CapPrm: 00000000ffffdffe
> CapEff: 00000000ffffdffe
> [root@masu tak]#

Neat.  A bigger-stick version of not adding the account to
group wheel.  I'll use that.

Is there any reason not to have a separate /etc/login.capbounds
config file, though, so the account can still have a full name?
Did you only use that for convenience of proof of concept, or
is there another reason?

> # BTW, I replaced the James's address in the Cc: list,
> # because MTA does not accept it.

Thanks!  I don't know what happened to my alias for him...

thanks,
-serge

> -- 
> KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> 
> ************************************************************
>     pam_cap_drop.c
> ************************************************************
> 
> /*
>  * pam_cap_drop.c module -- drop capabilities bounding set
>  *
>  * Copyright: 2007 KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
>  */
> 
> #include <errno.h>
> #include <pwd.h>
> #include <stdlib.h>
> #include <stdio.h>
> #include <string.h>
> #include <syslog.h>
> #include <sys/prctl.h>
> #include <sys/types.h>
> 
> #include <security/pam_modules.h>
> 
> #ifndef PR_CAPBSET_DROP
> #define PR_CAPBSET_DROP 24
> #endif
> 
> static char *captable[] = {
> 	"cap_chown",
> 	"cap_dac_override",
> 	"cap_dac_read_search",
> 	"cap_fowner",
> 	"cap_fsetid",
> 	"cap_kill",
> 	"cap_setgid",
> 	"cap_setuid",
> 	"cap_setpcap",
> 	"cap_linux_immutable",
> 	"cap_net_bind_service",
> 	"cap_net_broadcast",
> 	"cap_net_admin",
> 	"cap_net_raw",
> 	"cap_ipc_lock",
> 	"cap_ipc_owner",
> 	"cap_sys_module",
> 	"cap_sys_rawio",
> 	"cap_sys_chroot",
> 	"cap_sys_ptrace",
> 	"cap_sys_pacct",
> 	"cap_sys_admin",
> 	"cap_sys_boot",
> 	"cap_sys_nice",
> 	"cap_sys_resource",
> 	"cap_sys_time",
> 	"cap_sys_tty_config",
> 	"cap_mknod",
> 	"cap_lease",
> 	"cap_audit_write",
> 	"cap_audit_control",
> 	"cap_setfcap",
> 	NULL,
> };
> 
> 
> PAM_EXTERN int
> pam_sm_open_session(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags,
>                     int argc, const char **argv)
> {
> 	struct passwd *pwd;
> 	char *pos, *buf;
> 	char *username = NULL;
> 
> 	/* open system logger */
> 	openlog("pam_cap_bset", LOG_PERROR | LOG_PID, LOG_AUTHPRIV);
> 
> 	/* get the unix username */
> 	if (pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (void *) &username) != PAM_SUCCESS || !username)
> 		return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
> 
> 	/* get the passwd entry */
> 	pwd = getpwnam(username);
> 	if (!pwd)
> 		return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
> 
> 	/* Is there "cap_drop=" ? */
> 	pos = strstr(pwd->pw_gecos, "cap_drop=");
> 	if (pos) {
> 		buf = strdup(pos + sizeof("cap_drop=") - 1);
> 		if (!buf)
> 			return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
> 		pos = strtok(buf, ",");
> 		while (pos) {
> 			int rc, i;
> 
> 			for (i=0; captable[i]; i++) {
> 				if (!strcmp(pos, captable[i])) {
> 					rc = prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, i);
> 					if (rc < 0) {
> 						syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "user %s could not drop %s (%s)",
> 						       username, captable[i], strerror(errno));
> 						break;
> 					}
> 					syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "user %s drops %s\n", username, captable[i]);
> 					goto next;
> 				}
> 			}
> 			break;
> 		next:
> 			pos = strtok(NULL, ",");
> 		}
> 		free(buf);
> 	} else {
> 		syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "user %s does not have 'cap_drop=' property", username);
> 	}
> 	return PAM_SUCCESS;
> }
> 
> PAM_EXTERN int
> pam_sm_close_session(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags,
>                      int argc, const char **argv)
> {
> 	/* do nothing */
> 	return PAM_SUCCESS;
> }
> 
> ************************************************************
> -
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