Re: sys_chroot+sys_fchdir Fix

From: Al Viro
Date: Wed Sep 26 2007 - 14:41:10 EST

On Wed, Sep 26, 2007 at 08:04:14PM +0930, David Newall wrote:
> Al Viro wrote:
> >Oh, for fsck sake... Folks, it's standard-required behaviour. Ability
> >to chroot() implies the ability to break out of it. Could we please
> >add that (along with reference to SuS) to l-k FAQ and be done with that
> >nonsense?
> I'm pretty confident that it's only standard behavior for Linux. Every
> other unix says it's not allowed.

OK, the possibilities are
* you've discovered a bug in all Unices (BTW, even FreeBSD *does*
allow to break out of some chroots in that fashion; RTFS and you'll see -
just pay attention to setting fdp->fd_jdir logics in kern/vfs_syscalls.c:
change_root(); it sets jail boundary on _first_ chroot and if you've got
nested chroots, you can leave them just fine by use of SCM_RIGHTS to hold
directory descriptor). All hail David, nevermind that this behaviour had
been described in Unix FAQs since _way_ back.
* you've misunderstood the purpose of chroot(), the fact that
behaviour in question is at the very least extremely common on Unix and
the fact that any code relying on root-proof chroot(2) is broken and needs
to be fixed, simply because chroot is _not_ root-proof on (at least) almost
all systems.

Note that the last statement applies in both cases; it's simply reality.
Insisting that behaviour known for decades is a bug since it contradicts
your rather convoluted reading of the standards... Looks rather silly,
IMO, but that has zero practical consequences anyway. Userland code can't
rely on root-proof chroot(2), period.
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