On Wed, Jun 13, 2007 at 12:14:40PM -0400, Albert Cahalan wrote:
> On 6/13/07, Chris Mason <chris.mason@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >On Wed, Jun 13, 2007 at 01:45:28AM -0400, Albert Cahalan wrote:
> >> * secure delete via destruction of per-file or per-block random crypto
> >I'd rather keep secure delete as a userland problem (or a layered FS
> >problem). When you take backups and other copies of the file into
> >account, it's a bigger problem than btrfs wants to tackle right now.
> It can't be a userland problem if you allow disk blocks to move.
> Volume resizing, logging/journalling, etc. -- they combine to make
> the userland solution essentially impossible. (one could wipe the
> whole partition, or maybe fill ALL space on the volume)
Right about here is where I would insert a long story about ecryptfs, or
encryption solutions that happen all in userland. At any rate, it is
outside the scope of v1.0, even though I definitely agree it is an
important problem for some people.
> >> * atomic creation of copy-on-write directory trees
> >Do you mean something more fine grained than the current snapshotting
> I believe so. Example: I have a linux-2.6 directory. It's not
> a mount point or anything special like that. I want to copy
> it to a new directory called wip, without actually copying
> all the blocks. To all the normal POSIX API stuff, this copy
> should look like the result of "cp -a", not hard links.
This would be a snapshot, which has to be done on a subvolume right now.
It is not as nice as being able to pick a random directory, but I've
only been able to get this far by limiting the feature scope
significantly. What I did do was make subvolumes very cheap...just make
a bunch of them.