Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/11] security: AppArmor - Overview

[Joshua Brindle]

Pavel Machek wrote:
> > In the security world, there is a huge tradition of the best being the
> > enemy of the good --- and the best being so painful to use that people
> > don't want to use it, or the moment it gets in the way (either because
> > of performance reasons or their application does something that
> > requires painful configuration of the SELinux policy files), they
> > deconfigure it.  At which point the "best" becomes useless.
> >
> > You may or may not agree with the philosophical architecture question,
> > but that doesn't necessarily make it "broken by design".  Choice is
> > good; if AppArmor forces SELinux to become less painful to use and
> > configure, then that in the long run will be a good thing.
> >     
>
> SELinux kernel support can _almost_ do what AA does; with notable
> exception of labels for new files. That can probably be fixed with
> patch of reasonable size (or maybe even with LD_PRELOAD library, glibc
> modification, or stuff like that). (There was post showing that in
> this long flamewar).
>   
New file labels based on path should not be addressed in the kernel and 
LD_PRELOAD would be incredibly hacky. Our solution to the problem is 
restorecond (http://danwalsh.livejournal.com/4368.html) which addresses 
users who want to be able to mkdir public_html and immediately use it. 
Userland solutions like this will make SELinux easier and easier to use, 
and they already have. Anyone not keeping up with SELinux lately a 
tremendous amount has been done in the area of usability as outlined at 
this years selinux symposium 
(http://selinux-symposium.org/2006/slides/01-smalley-yir.pdf).


Joshua
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