Re: [PATCH] Filesystem linking protections

[Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro]

El lun, 07-02-2005 a las 14:14 -0500, Valdis.Kletnieks@xxxxxx escribió:
> On Mon, 07 Feb 2005 19:57:06 +0100, Lorenzo =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Hern=E1ndez_?= =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Garc=EDa-Hierro?= said:
> 
> > This patch adds two checks to do_follow_link() and sys_link(), for
> > prevent users to follow (untrusted) symlinks owned by other users in
> > world-writable +t directories (i.e. /tmp), unless the owner of the
> > symlink is the owner of the directory, users will also not be able to
> > hardlink to files they do not own.
> 
> This should be done using the LSM framework.  That's what it's *THERE* for.
> I've previously posted an LSM that does these checks (and a few others), it
> should be in the archives.

vSecurity also implements this and many other "ported" features from
OpenWall and grSecurity.

But It's better to give users a "secure-by-default" status, at least on
those parts that don't affect negatively the stability or the
performance itself.

The LSM hook call is before the check, so, LSM framework still has the
control over it, until it releases the operation giving control back to
the standard function.

If users must rely on LSM or other external solutions for applying basic
security checks (as the framework itself only provides the way to apply
them, the checks need to be implemented in a module), then we are making
them unable to be protected using the "default" configuration.

Cheers,
-- 
Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro <lorenzo@xxxxxxx> 
[1024D/6F2B2DEC] & [2048g/9AE91A22][http://tuxedo-es.org]

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