[PATCH 2.6.10-mm2] fs/coda Re: [Coverity] Untrusted user data in kernel

From: Jan Harkes
Date: Fri Jan 07 2005 - 17:01:33 EST



This patch adds bounds checks for tainted scalars
(reported by Brian Fulton and Ted Unangst, Coverity Inc.).

Signed-off-by: Jan Harkes <jaharkes@xxxxxxxxxx>

Index: linux-2.6.10-mm2/include/linux/coda.h
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.10-mm2.orig/include/linux/coda.h 2005-01-07 16:36:03.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.10-mm2/include/linux/coda.h 2005-01-07 16:42:20.000000000 -0500
@@ -761,8 +761,8 @@
struct ViceIoctl {
void __user *in; /* Data to be transferred in */
void __user *out; /* Data to be transferred out */
- short in_size; /* Size of input buffer <= 2K */
- short out_size; /* Maximum size of output buffer, <= 2K */
+ u_short in_size; /* Size of input buffer <= 2K */
+ u_short out_size; /* Maximum size of output buffer, <= 2K */
};

struct PioctlData {
Index: linux-2.6.10-mm2/fs/coda/upcall.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.10-mm2.orig/fs/coda/upcall.c 2005-01-07 16:36:03.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.10-mm2/fs/coda/upcall.c 2005-01-07 16:53:03.074276720 -0500
@@ -555,6 +555,11 @@
goto exit;
}

+ if (data->vi.out_size > VC_MAXDATASIZE) {
+ error = -EINVAL;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
inp->coda_ioctl.VFid = *fid;

/* the cmd field was mutated by increasing its size field to
@@ -583,19 +588,26 @@
error, coda_f2s(fid));
goto exit;
}
+
+ if (outsize < (long)outp->coda_ioctl.data + outp->coda_ioctl.len) {
+ error = -EINVAL;
+ goto exit;
+ }

/* Copy out the OUT buffer. */
if (outp->coda_ioctl.len > data->vi.out_size) {
error = -EINVAL;
- } else {
- if (copy_to_user(data->vi.out,
- (char *)outp + (long)outp->coda_ioctl.data,
- data->vi.out_size)) {
- error = -EFAULT;
- goto exit;
- }
+ goto exit;
}

+ /* Copy out the OUT buffer. */
+ if (copy_to_user(data->vi.out,
+ (char *)outp + (long)outp->coda_ioctl.data,
+ outp->coda_ioctl.len)) {
+ error = -EFAULT;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
exit:
CODA_FREE(inp, insize);
return error;
-
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