Re: [PATCH] track capabilities in default dummy security module code

[Chris Wright]

* Chris Wright (chrisw@xxxxxxxx) wrote:
> Switch dummy logic around to set cap_* bits during exec and set*uid based
> on basic uid check.  Then check cap_* bits during capable() (rather than
> doing basic uid check).  This ensures that capability bits are properly
> initialized in case the capability module is later loaded.

OK, somehow I managed to botch this one.  It happens to work fine, but I
should have been more careful with forward porting this 1+ year old patch.
The exec-time calc should go in bprm_apply_creds, not bprm_free_security.
Thanks to Stephen for spotting my mistake.

Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@xxxxxxxx>

===== security/dummy.c 1.50 vs edited =====
--- 1.50/security/dummy.c	2005-01-04 13:14:10 -08:00
+++ edited/security/dummy.c	2005-01-04 14:45:31 -08:00
@@ -180,7 +180,6 @@ static int dummy_bprm_alloc_security (st
 
 static void dummy_bprm_free_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
-	dummy_capget(current, &current->cap_effective, &current->cap_inheritable, &current->cap_permitted);
 	return;
 }
 
@@ -197,6 +196,8 @@ static void dummy_bprm_apply_creds (stru
 
 	current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid;
 	current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid;
+
+	dummy_capget(current, &current->cap_effective, &current->cap_inheritable, &current->cap_permitted);
 }
 
 static int dummy_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-
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