Re: SG_IO and security

From: Linus Torvalds
Date: Thu Aug 12 2004 - 12:04:32 EST




On Thu, 12 Aug 2004, Jeff Garzik wrote:
>
> Linus Torvalds wrote:
> >
> > On Thu, 12 Aug 2004, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> >
> >>Hmm.. This still allows the old "junk" commands (SCSI_IOCTL_SEND_COMMAND).
> >
> >
> > Btw, I think the _right_ thing to check is the write access of the file
> > descriptor. If you have write access to a block device, you can delete the
> > data, so you might as well be able to do the raw commands. And that would
> > allow things like "disk" groups etc to work and burn CD's.
>
> Define raw commands. I certainly don't want non-root users to be able
> to issue FORMAT UNIT on my hard drive.

Ehh? The same ones you allow to write all over the raw device?

Let's see now:

brw-rw---- 1 root disk 3, 0 Jan 30 2003 /dev/hda

would you put people you don't trust with your disk in the "disk" group?

Right. If you trust somebody enough that you give him write access to the
disk, then you might as well trust him enough to do commands on it.

Conversely, if you don't trust him enough to do things like that, you
shouldn't give him write access in the first place.

It's a hell of a lot easier to destroy a disk with

dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/xxx bs=8k

than it is to do it with some special malicious command.

And yes, there's clearly a difference, but in general I'd say it is the
_data_ on the disk that is worth something to you. The disk itself? Do you
really fundamentally care?

Linus
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