Re: [PATCH] Delete cryptoloop

[Jean-Luc Cooke]

On Mon, Aug 02, 2004 at 07:16:56PM -0400, James Morris wrote:
> On Mon, 2 Aug 2004, David Wagner wrote:
> 
> > The point I was making is that there are other scenarios where Cryptoloop
> > falls apart in much more devastating ways.  For instance, if the attacker
> > can modify the ciphertexts stored on your hard disk and you continue
> > using the hard disk afterwards, then really nasty attacks become possible.
> > Other attacks become possible if the attacker can observe the ciphertexts
> > stored on your hard disk at multiple points in time.  The question I was
> > asking is this: Does anyone care about these latter types of scenarios?
> 
> I think the common threat scenarios out of the above are:
> 
> 1) Attacker can observe ciphertexts at multiple points in time.
> 2) Attacker steals disk/computer and disappears with it.

Examples for #1 being: mounting a file system image across NFS (their home
directory for example).  In this case, and attacker can see almost *all* disk
reads and writes.

Thanks for your input on this David W., I was @ OLS... silly intermittent
WiFi...

JLC
-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/