Re: question about /proc/<PID>/mem in 2.4

[FabF]

On Mon, 2004-07-05 at 15:27, Tigran Aivazian wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> I noticed that in 2.4.x kernels the fs/proc/base.c:mem_read() function has 
> this permission check:
> 
>         if (!MAY_PTRACE(task) || !may_ptrace_attach(task))
>                 return -ESRCH;
> 
> Are you sure it shouldn't be like this instead:
> 
>         if (!MAY_PTRACE(task) && !may_ptrace_attach(task))
>                 return -ESRCH;
> 
> Because, normally MAY_PTRACE() is 0 (i.e. for any process worth looking at :)
> so may_ptrace_attach() is never even called.
> 
MAY_PTRACE is 1 normally AFAICS.The check as it stands wants both to
have non zero returns so is more restrictive than the one you're asking
for.

> Is there any reason for the above check on each read(2)? Shouldn't there 
> be a simple check at ->open() time only? I assume this is to close some 
> obscure "security hole" but I would like to see the explanation of how 
> could any problem arise if a) such check wasn't done at all (except at 
> open(2) time) or at least b) there was && instead of ||.
cf. chmod thread.

> 
> The 2.6.x situation is similar except the addition of the security stuff.
> 
> Kind regards
> Tigran
> 
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