encrypted swap(beating a dead horse)

From: David Maynor (david.maynor@oit.gatech.edu)
Date: Wed Aug 08 2001 - 10:17:36 EST


>>
>>2. anyone stealing a disk to get data out of it sure as hell isn't going
>>to boot it up and run your init scripts.

This is true, so the best thing for this, in my opinion, instead of
throwing the crypto blanket over everything, scrub the swap when a process
is terminated so when the machine is shut down, you won't have to clean the
entire swap.

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