Re: Ke: Process Capabilities on 2.2.16, Sendmail problem revisited

From: Pavel Machek (pavel@suse.cz)
Date: Thu Jun 15 2000 - 03:01:42 EST


Hi!

> > Do you want to look for privileged executables? If so, elfcap
> > is little different than inode-based bits. You can use the
> > proper search tool in either case. Elfcap does have the advantage
> > of giving you a quick check via regular "find" though. The real
> > winner here is the in-memory system, since the kernel could provide
> > a list via /proc.
>
> The "proper" search tool requires me to read the header of each file
> in the system to determine if it carries any embedded capabilities. This
> takes too long on large file systems.

No. It requires you reading header of each _setuid 0_ file. Non-setuid
0 files are only as dangerous as files without elfcap headers; or
maybe less.

NOTE NOTE NOTE: elfcap are really equivalent to some code at beggining
of main. They only *DROP* capabilities, not make them bigger.

(Is there chance of you talking me at pavel@atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz?)

> > > Any use of a capability is a security event.
> > > Any attempt to use a capability that is not authorized is a
> > > security violation.
> > > The level audit logging is up to the facility.
> >
> > So what? Elfcap can handle this perfectly well. Like the other
> > two proposed systems, elfcap is a kernel feature. You can trust
> > that the logging will happen.
>
> It cannot detect the unauthorized addition of capabilities to an
> executable.

If someone can write to your setuid executables, you have other
serious problems, anyway.
                                                                Pavel

-- 
The best software in life is free (not shareware)!		Pavel
GCM d? s-: !g p?:+ au- a--@ w+ v- C++@ UL+++ L++ N++ E++ W--- M- Y- R+

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