Re: Bug in how capability inheritance is handled in "fs/exec.c", 2.3.99

From: Pavel Machek (pavel@suse.cz)
Date: Tue May 30 2000 - 14:51:38 EST


Hi!

> new PIE=(all,0,all) - which means any executed programs will default
> to inheriting *no priviledges* from the suid program.
> This is *DESIRABLE*. For privileges to be propagated,
> The SUID program would have to explicitly set
> its Inheritable set. This means the default is
> to not propagate. This is a 'good' thing. Exec'ing
> a shell out of a SUID program through a buffer
> exploit will default to a capset of (0,0,0) in the
> shell. Seems, at least, moderately useful...

So what? I can not execute setuid shell, but I can freely do anything
I could do with the shell. I'll add myself to
~root/.ssh/authorized_keys instead of running root shell. This is
called security by obscurity.

(Still it can be a little bit usefull.)
                                                                Pavel

-- 
I'm pavel@ucw.cz. "In my country we have almost anarchy and I don't care."
Panos Katsaloulis describing me w.r.t. patents me at discuss@linmodems.org

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