[ 77/86] sock_diag: Fix out-of-bounds access to sock_diag_handlers[]

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Date: Tue Feb 26 2013 - 19:09:57 EST


3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------


From: Mathias Krause <minipli@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

[ Upstream commit 6e601a53566d84e1ffd25e7b6fe0b6894ffd79c0 ]

Userland can send a netlink message requesting SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY
with a family greater or equal then AF_MAX -- the array size of
sock_diag_handlers[]. The current code does not test for this
condition therefore is vulnerable to an out-of-bound access opening
doors for a privilege escalation.

Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
net/core/sock_diag.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/net/core/sock_diag.c
+++ b/net/core/sock_diag.c
@@ -126,6 +126,9 @@ static int __sock_diag_rcv_msg(struct sk
if (nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*req))
return -EINVAL;

+ if (req->sdiag_family >= AF_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
hndl = sock_diag_lock_handler(req->sdiag_family);
if (hndl == NULL)
err = -ENOENT;


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