Re: unprivileged mounts git tree
From: Miklos Szeredi
Date: Thu Sep 04 2008 - 02:43:22 EST
On Wed, 3 Sep 2008, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Miklos Szeredi (miklos@xxxxxxxxxx):
> > On Wed, 3 Sep 2008, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > > Ooh.
> > >
> > > You predicate the turning of shared mount to a slave mount on
> > > !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN). But in fact it's the mount by a privileged
> > > user, turning the mount into a user mount, which you want to convert.
> > > So my series of steps was:
> > >
> > > as root:
> > > (1) mount --bind /mnt /mnt
> > > (2) mount --make-rshared /mnt
> > > (3) /usr/src/mmount-0.3/mmount --bind -o user=hallyn /mnt \
> > > /home/hallyn/etc/mnt
> > > as hallyn:
> > > (4) mount --bind /usr /home/hallyn/etc/mnt/usr
> > >
> > > You are turning mounts from shared->slave at step 4, but in fact we need
> > > to do it at step 3, where we do have CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
> > Well, that's arguable: I think root should be able to shoot itself in
> > the foot by doing step 3.
> Maybe I'm not thinking right, but long-term is there any reason why we
> should require privilege in order to do step 3, so long as the user has
> read access to the source and write access to the destination?
> I don't think there is. Other than this glitch. That's a powerful
> reason to fix the glitch.
Agreed, without privileges it's unacceptable to allow step 3 as is.
> The other argument is that, frankly, I think most people are still
> either unaware of, or confused by, mounts propagation. Letting root
> shoot himself in the foot is reasonable only to a point.
Hmm, I think there are infinite ways in which root can mess up mount
propagation, and this is not even the worst. I'm not trying to
belittle this bug: done unprivileged it's unacceptable. But with
privileges, I really don't know if we should change the propagation
semantics for this corner case, they are complicated enough already.
> > Generally we don't restrict what root can
> > do. OTOH I agree that current behavior is ugly in that it provides
> > different semantics for privileged/non-privileged callers.
> > Perhaps it would be cleaner to simply not allow step 4, instead of
> > playing tricks with changing the propagation type.
> If the user or admin can simply (I haven't tested)
> mmount --bind --make-rslave -o user=hallyn /mnt \
> then returning -EPERM if --make-rslave was not provided is reasonable
Right, that sounds perfect. the only problem is, bind mount currently
ignores the propagation flags, for no good reason I can see.
That's a separate patch though. I'll look into it.
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